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A Tale of Sovereignty and Liberalism:
The Lockean Myth of Intellectual
Property
Shaoul Sussman*
The influence of John Locke’s thought upon the general legal
perception of property rights cannot be overstated. Locke’s Labor
theory of property holds that property originally comes about
through individual exertion upon natural objects and that legal
rights in the result of this labor are in fact property rights. The
Lockean theory of property has dominated the Anglo-American
legal discourse and is frequently used to justify various property
regulation schemes. Despite this fact, many scholars have struggled
to apply the theory to the field of intellectual property, and in
particular to the field of patents and copyright. Many have
attempted to square the circle, but the results of these efforts are
rather unpersuasive.
This Note proposes to introduce a different framework of
jurisprudence that better explains the underpinnings of the current
intellectual property legal regime. This framework builds upon and
applies the Aristocratic concepts of commutative and distributive
justice to the concept of intellectual property. The Note argues that
the notion of intellectual property is a legal concept that is first
delineated by sovereign authorities in an act of commutative justice.
Only after the ‘rules of the game’ are articulated by the sovereign,
private actors can enter the legally delineated markets and engage
in acts of commutative exchange. The Note demonstrates that from
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its inception, the field of intellectual property was fundamentally a
sovereign legal endeavor and that despite Locke’s theoretical
contributions to the field, at no time did the courts of England ever
applied his own theory to the administration of intellectual property.
Instead, the courts of England have time and again reaffirmed the
fact that intellectual property is legal right that is granted by a
sovereign and is founded upon the principals of distributive justice.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2011, the America Invents Act (AIA) was
signed into law with the objective of establishing a more efficient
and streamlined patent system.1 The AIA’s most significant change
was the conversion of the United States patent system from a “firstto-invent” to a “first-inventor-to-file” framework.2
Theoretically, this law should also apply in the rare event in
which two scientists are racing simultaneously for years to develop
an identical cure to the same life-threatening disease while being
unaware of the other’s laborious progress.3 In this case of accidental
competition, the patent protection would only be granted to the first
inventor who successfully filed their invention with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO).4 It follows that what ultimately
determines the inventors’ patent rights is not the inventor’s actual
labor but merely their good fortune: that their application was
adequate and filed just in time, leaving the other scientist with
nothing to claim but their shattered ambitions.5

1

35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (enacted as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125
Stat. 284, 285–86).
2
See id.
3
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that the AIA first-to-file system puts pressure on companies to
file early in order to not lose priority).
4
See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 3 (3d ed. 2013).
5
See id.
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What is most surprising perhaps in this rather harsh law is that it
stands in clear contradiction to Locke’s theory of property—which
asserts that property is generated and determined by labor.6
According to Locke’s account, since both inventors came up with
the same cure at approximately the same time through their
independent and respective labor, both should be conferred with
equal patent rights, regardless of the time in which they submitted
their applications.7 Yet, this view completely undermines the current
patent system, whose value rests entirely upon the ability to both
determine and maintain commercial exclusivity.8 Hence, Locke’s
labor theory cannot help us to explain the foundation of intellectual
property jurisprudence.9
The purpose of this Note is not to question the AIA’s validity
nor that of our prevailing legal doctrines, but rather to challenge its
current theoretical grounding and to provide a more accurate
account thereof. This alternative theoretical foundation is by no
means new10; it can be traced back at least 2,400 years to the
writings of Aristotle and his division of the administration of justice
into two basic forms: distributive and commutative.11 According to
Aristotle, distributive justice concerns the relationship between the
sovereign body and its individual members.12 It describes the
process by which rights and legal privileges are distributed by the
sovereign among the private individuals by the state, according to a
6

See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE §§ 27–43, at
18–27 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690).
7
See id.
8
Some “copy-left” advocates argue that this result is preferable in reducing the price
of technological innovation. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally
Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 817, 819 (1990).
9
See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game
Theory Justification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2018) (acknowledging that Lockean theory faces
challenges when applied to IP, while other scholars have offered a defense).
10
See Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though Flourishing Justification of
Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus International
Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 335–36 (2017) (proposing that modern
models of IP, including Lockean theory, fail to consider distributive justice).
11
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 84–85 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000) (c. 349 B.C.E.).
12
See id.
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common, measurable dispensation scheme.13 By contrast,
commutative justice is a private type of regulation that orders and
characterizes the relationship of the individual members of the
political body amongst themselves.14 This relationship encapsulates
the commensurable commercial exchange between specific
individuals and is the basis of all private transactions.15
The field of intellectual property law adheres to this basic
Aristotelian division. First, the state provides a particular class of
individuals (namely inventors) with property rights through
legislation. Legislation assigns to this class a particular right of
ownership: the right to exclude all others from introducing or
offering inventions that are substantially similar and from selling
goods that embody them.16 Then, the state designates a certain
period of time for such privigle.17 And lastly, but perhaps most
importantly, the state provides the inventor with a legal forum to
prevent others from infringing upon this right during the limited
period in which their invention is protected by law.18 All of these
actions represent sovereign acts of “distributive justice” in which the
state distributes the exclusive rights in a given property to one
individual and actively precludes all others from using it in any
unauthorized way.19
Following this distributive allocation of rights, the sovereign
allows private individuals to interact freely within this legally
13

See id.
See id.
15
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2086–90 (Christian Classics 1981)
(1265–1274).
16
See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 593 (2008).
It is also interesting to note that this designation is also applied by the state in other fields
such as criminal law. Some possessions such as illicit drugs are not legally recognized as
property and governments prohibit any type of ownership in these tangible objects. In fact,
all private citizens are excluded from a right to own this type of object. See id. at 609 n. 61.
17
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries . . . .”).
18
See 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2012).
19
Theories of distributive justice seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of
goods among members of society. Brian Duignan, Justice, Social Concept, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/justice-social-concept [https://perma.cc
/X4ZR-JDJH] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
14
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established marketplace in accordance with the laws of
“commutative justice.” Private individuals are allowed to
voluntarily bargain for the trade of goods. For example, inventors
may authorize others to embody those inventions in their products,
adapt them into tangible goods, and use them in any other way
agreed upon by both parties.20 The current field of intellectual
property also demonstrates the Aristotelian principle that from a
procedural prespective distributive justice precedes and facilitates
commutative justice. Indeed, it is only once the ‘rules of the game’
are set and clearly stated (e.g., what constitutes intellectual property;
the length of time that it is protected; and so on) that individual
actors can enter the scene and negotiate meaningfully the terms of
the various relevant exchanges.21 Delineating property rights and
enforcement are a necessary condition for efficient market
exchange.22
By surveying the history of intellectual property in England
since the invention of the printing press up until the late 18th century,
this Note demonstrates that the Aristotelian principle not only
explains our current legal regime but also the regime that existed at
the time in which Locke articulated his own revisionist theory.
This Note suggests that Locke’s labor theory was a crucial and
extremely influential part of an organized theoretical assault upon
the role of the English absolute monarch in regulating property
through the legal administration of distributive justice. The three
main theoretical protagonists in this story are Edward Coke, John

20

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This provision allows “an assignment, mortgage,
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or
of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time
or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”
21
In the United States, these commutative rights of exchange are carefully delineated
by statutory law. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
22
It is essential not to conflate this understanding of the law with the traditional
utilitarian rationale of copyright. Utilitarianism was only first formulated during the late
18th Century and can be seen as directly criticizing this view. For further reading see
Quentin Skinner, A Genealogy of Liberty, Presented at Stanford Humanities Center for the
Harry Camp Memorial Lecture (Oct. 27, 2016), https://cluelesspoliticalscientist
.wordpress.com/2017/01/27/a-genealogy-of-liberty-by-quentin-skinner-lecture-transcript/
[https://perma.cc/CDU2-5H3D].
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Locke and William Blackstone.23 Each of the three sought to
contribute to, and thereby further consolidate his predecessors’
attempt to formulate a theory of property that severed the well
established connection between sovereignty and commerce or better
still: between state regulation and private interest.
Intellectual property jurisprudence proved to be a particularly
thorny issue for these thinkers. For unlike land or chattel, which
conformed rather nicely into the liberal myth of common law
property, both Locke and Blackstone recognized the difficulty in
explaining intellectual property by relying only upon the vocabulary
of commutative justice. Each contemporary attempt to conform
intellectual property to their views was met with great practical
difficulties and the theoretical barriers which had to be overcome
are charted in detail.24 The most disquieting conclusion that this
Note makes is that despite all of these theoretical and concrete
failures, Locke’s and Blackstone’s view ultimately won the day and
became the orthodox dogma in the field of intellectual property law
thoery. This is especially surprising given the fact that their theory
was never adopted by the courts of law nor applies to present day
legal practice. This historical schism produced a pronounced
dissonance between legal theory and practice which is apparent to
this day and which, further, suggests that at times illusory legal
ideology can exist alongside the actual law.
Part I of this Note reviews the historical development of rights
in copies in England from 1455 up until 1688. It illustrates how
Absolutism and later populism played a pivotal role in shaping the
actual structure of copyright law to this day.25 In particular, the fact
that rights in copies were accurately regarded as a sovereign grant
23

Edward Coke was an English barrister, judge and member of the English Parliament
(1552–1634). Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke
[https://perma.cc/SS9H-8NA8]
(last
updated Aug. 30, 2018). John Locke was an English philosopher and physician (1632–
1704). Graham A.J. Rogers, John Locke, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/biography/John-Locke [https://perma.cc/CY9E-D644] (last updated Oct. 24, 2018) .
William Blackstone was an English barrister and judge (1723–1780). Sir William
Blackstone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/WilliamBlackstone [https://perma.cc/U89E-P3VQ] (last updated July 6, 2018).
24
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9, at 33–34.
25
See generally PETER W. M. BLAYNEY, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY AND THE PRINTERS
OF LONDON, 1501–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
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of exclusive dispensation of rights over a given literary work. This
view of rights in copies was also entirely consistent with the overall
legal perception of property during that time.26
In Part II, this Note traces the growing influence of Locke’s
labor theory alongside the gradual demise of the royal prerogative
and explains how these processes influenced copyright law in the
late Seventeenth century. Locke’s theory argued that role of
government is to protect “natural” private property from wrongful
usurpation.27 This vision of government was held as antithetical to
the notion that the state should be charged with the dispensation of
property rights through the administration of distributive justice. In
addition, Locke’s ontological account of property deliberately
obscured the sovereign-distributive framework of property by
suggesting that property is exclusively established and shaped
through commutative justice. This Part also charts Locke’s
historical lobbying efforts in the field of intellectual property law
and the way he sought to reconcile the abstract principles of his
universal theory with actual legal regulation. In line with previous
research, it is argued that the substance of Locke’s proposal in the
field of intellectual property clearly contradicted his abstract
theoretical conception of property.
Part III of this Note surveys the Battle of the Booksellers. It is
viewed in a wider context that considers the influence of sovereignty
theory and distributive justice upon the field of intellectual property
law. By this time, Coke’s and Locke’s views on property penetrated
the legal discipline to such an extent that despite the inability to
apply their views to legal practice, not a single member of the Court
of Chancery or the House of Lords including William Blackstone
had disputed the soundness of their theory.
The conclusion suggests that from a general theoretical
standpoint, William Blackstone’s role in fortifying Locke’s
scholarly legacy is reflected in the current general acceptance of the
commutative theory of intellectual property.28 This acceptance is
26

Id.
LOCKE, supra note 6, § 27, at 306.
28
An exception in this respect is the outstanding contribution of Laura R. Ford. In her
work she argues that “[i]ntellectual property is thus a creature of the nation-state, just as
much for Eighteenth Century Britain, as for the United States and France” and that “the
27
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manifested in the academic engagement with Locke’s work which
has only increased in the last twenty-five years.29 In particular, both
proponents and critics of Locke’s thinking accept the notion that the
role of intellectual property law is to balance the commutative rights
of individuals in their property against the rights of others.30 Even
Locke’s most staunch critics do not question the theoretical validity
of his direct attack on the role of sovereign distributive dispensation
in intellectual property law.31 The conclusion of this Note also bears
some practical suggestions: (1) further research should focus upon
how sovereign frameworks informed the formation of legal rights in
other fields of property and, (2) Eighteenth century English
jurisprudence should play a lesser role in shaping our current
understanding of American intellectual property law.
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. The Scope of Sovereign Authority and Royal Prerogative
Under the Rule of Henry VIII
As opposed to the political and commercial situation in Locke’s
time, both Parliament, the common law courts, and commerce courts
in the beginning of the Sixteenth century were in practice subjected
to the ultimate sovereign will of the king. Within this constitutional
scheme, it was the role of the courts of common law to enforce the
royal laws against crimes and to adjudicate civil disputes.32 The
Prerogative tradition implicitly excluded the ‘Lockean’ natural law argument.” Laura R.
Ford, Prerogative, Nationalized: The Social Formation of Intellectual Property, 97 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 270, 304–05 (2015).
29
See Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 891, 892 (2006).
30
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1998).
31
See Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (2003). Zemer claims that Locke’s lobbying
efforts in the field indicate that he was concerned with balancing the rights of individuals
with the common good. If adopted at face value, this argument further supports the notion
that Locke’s theory and political practice are squarely at odds. Zemer, supra note 29, at
895.
32
See PHILIP EDWARDS, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN ENGLISH STATE, 1460–1660, at
216–19 (2001).
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exact hierarchal organization of these courts was contested at times,
but despite their seemingly arbitrary positioning within the general
legal structure, all of these courts were formally overseen and
sanctioned exclusively by the king.33 Officially, the king was
considered as the ‘author’ of the common law. This notion was
reinforced by the careful historical documentation of the fact that
the English judiciary was a creation of Henry II and that his judges
were directly dependent on the king, in whose name they dispensed
justice.34 The king also retained his historical privilege to decide any
case that was brought before the courts, although actual direct
sovereign intervention was infrequent.35
With regards to property rights, the king, as in the days of Henry
II, retained his formal position as the sole allodial owner of land in
England, despite the ever-increasing control of private entities over
land possessions and a general lack of respect to medieval legal
traditions.36 The king and his appointed agents were in charge of the
dispensation of property rights. The highest form of property right,
as in the days of William the Conqueror, remained the possession of
fiefs or rights in fee simple, and property disputes were resolved by
the king’s judges in the various royal courts of common law.37 Of
particular importance for this Note, the king was also entitled to
create royal patents and construct monopolies in certain fields of
commerce or upon certain industries such as mining.38

33

See George Burton Adams, Origin of the English Courts of Common Law, 30 YALE
L.J. 798, 802 (1921).
34
See RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN THE AGE OF GLANVILL AND
BRACTON C. 1176–1239, at 25–39 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1985).
35
See DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE LAWS:
RELIGION, POLITICS, AND JURISPRUDENCE, 1578–1616, at 16–18 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2014).
36
See E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and
at Common Law, 46 THE L. Q. REV. 141, 144 (1896).
37
See COLIN KIDD, SUBVERTING SCOTLAND’S PAST: SCOTTISH WHIG HISTORIANS AND
THE CREATION OF AN ANGLO-BRITISH IDENTITY, 1689– C.1830, at 131–34 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2003).
38
See generally Adams, supra note 33. Allodial is a legal construct that refers to the
ultimate owner of a given property item. See G. E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of
Property in Seventeenth Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 87–89 (1980).
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B. Copyright Law Under the Rule of King Henry VIII
Modern printing was introduced to London during the 1470s and
ever since then, the English book trade was subject to some kind of
sovereign oversight.39 From 1487 every form of printed material
could potentially undergo sovereign inspection in which its content
was examined and at times censored if it was deemed to contain
materials that were considered by the censors as heretical or
treasonous.40 By the time Henry VIII assumed the throne, a number
of medieval guilds were engaged in the business of book printing.41
The first chronicled interest in some form of copyright
protection emerged during the early years of Henry VII’s reign.42
Unlike manuscripts, which were produced upon demand and in
small quantities, book printing involved a significant initial
investment of capital in order to produce a book template.43
This financial risk was compounded with another new
commercial risk: unwarranted mechanical book copying.
Traditionally, qualitative differences which were readily apparent in
hand-written manuscripts suppressed book pirating on a commercial
scale.44 However, with the introduction of the printing machine,
such qualitative differences were suddenly less noticeable. As a
result, the unwarranted copying of the content of books became a
far more lucrative endeavor that posed a real commercial risk for
book printers.45
In light of these new threats, publishers actively sought for
means by which they could protect their investment.46 As a result, a
series of royal grants were instituted by Henry VII’s court in order
to ensure the economic viability of this newly introduced trade.47

39

See Ian Gadd, The Stationers’ Company in England Before 1710, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 81, 81–82 (Isabella Alexander & H.
Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016) [hereinafter Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710].
40
Id at 82.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 86.
43
Id. at 82.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 83.
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This rather trivial royal decree marks a significant moment in
the development of intellectual property law. From its inception, it
became clear to all the interests involved that the book printing
business could not rely only upon the rudimentary protection of the
‘commutative’ common law.48 Such protection would be limited
only to the actual book manuscripts and would therefore afford
little-to-no economic security to the book printers. In light of this,
since its legal conception it was clear that official sovereign
intervention was essential in establishing a viable market in
copyrights.49 Consequently, the early royal printing privileges in
copies were designed to provide real protection, albeit, by a
somewhat cumbersome and ineffective bureaucratic authority.50 In
practice, this protection was brought about by a sovereign decision
to actively preclude all but one printer from printing a given book.
Remarkable as it may seem, even at this very early stage the book
printing industry relied upon a distinct form of distributive law that
regulated property rights in the infant industry.51 Thus, even during
its initial stages, intellectual property, like other forms of goods or
chattels, essentially owed its actual commercial viability to the
distributive legal mechanism of the Crown and its courts of law.52
Hence, and similarly to other fields of the law, it seemed prefectly
normal to exercise distributive law in other fields of commerce such
as the granting of various trade monopolies.53
By the mid 1520s, over half of the active printers in England
obtained some form of royal privilege for their works and by the late
1530s, over a third of all the books that were printed in London
maintained some sort of derivative royal protection.54 The
prevalence of such printing privileges was ever growing but
nonetheless remained entirely voluntary.55 Typically, sovereign
protection was extended to a printer or a book after a petition to the
48

Id. at 87.
Id. at 87–88.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 143, 144–45 (1945).
54
See BLAYNEY, supra note 25, at 322–26.
55
In fact, more than two thirds of the books printed in London were unprotected by
privilege. Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 83–85.
49
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Crown was made by the individual who sought protection.56 As
historians have observed, these royal privileges were simply a grant
of temporary commercial monopoly and by no means translated into
an official royal endorsement of the book’s actual content.57
In practice, Henry VIII’s court failed to develop an actual legal
enforcement mechanism to protect the privileges it granted and this
fact rendered the issuance of royal privilege less and less
meaningful.58 But despite these issues of enforcement, up until
1510, the young book printing market required minimal legal
protection and sovereign regulation.59 This was due to the fact that
the entire printing industry was in the process of initial expansion
and its members were still limited in number.60 Moreover,
infringement was uncommon because printing privileges were
inherently temporary and even if the king at times granted a specific
printer a ‘perpetual privilege,’that privilege was extended until
either the printer’s or king’s death.61 Even in the rare cases of actual
infringement, the printer whose work was copied had to litigate his
case in the Court of Chancery—a costly affair which further deterred
actual litigation.62
C. The Influence of the ‘Absolutist’ State Theory upon the English
Constitutional Scheme
Under Henry VIII’s rule, England was a politically turbulent
society. Henry’s religious reform led to substantial clashes with the
English clergy and other political actors that swore their allegiance
to the Pope.63 In other parts of Europe, the Protestant reformation
resulted in outbreaks of religious wars that greatly threatened a
number of well-established continental monarchies.64
56

Id.
While the printing privilege of the book was protected, the content of it was not, and
it was entirely possible for a book printer to be prosecuted for the unlawful content that
was contained in his privileged copy. Id at 84.
58
See Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39 at 86.
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This period of unprecedented geopolitical instability gave birth
to the first early-modern monarchist state theory.65 This political
theory, which is termed by historians as “Absolutist state theory,” is
generally attributed to the French jurist Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and
is found in his seminal theoretical work ‘Les Six Livres de la
République’ (1576).66 Bodin argued that any political body or state
is, in fact, a union of people under the same sovereignty or
government.67 In essence, a state is a particular type of civil
association in which a mass of individuals is united in their
subjection to a ruling group.68 Bodin pointed out that in most cases
this ruling class is consistent of a monarch which is described as a
“head of state,” but in his treatises, Bodin admitted that sovereign
power could be held by the people themselves such as in the ancient
polity of Athens.69 Bodin nonetheless insisted that a strong natural
preference existed for the establishment of monarchical regimes
over any other form of government.70
The second contribution of the Absolutist theory was to
galvanize the metaphor of the king’s two bodies.71 In opposition to
medieval understandings of monarchy that identified the king as a
temporary wielder of sovereign power, the Absolutists held that any
monarch has two bodies.72 The first body was of course the corporal
person that was designated as king.73 The second body was that of
the eternal and ideal legal person of the monarch.74 The implications
65

See Quentin Skinner, The Sovereign State: A Genealogy, in SOVEREIGNTY IN
FRAGMENTS: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT 28–30 (Hent
Kalmo & Quentin Skinner eds., 2010) [hereinafter Skinner, Genealogy].
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of this distinction might seem trivial at first, but they denote a
significant milestone in the development of political and
constitutional theory.75 In feudal thought, the death of a king marked
a point of sovereign crisis in which multiple political actors and
factions came to assert their right to assume the throne.76
Additionally, the death of a king also marked a period of juridical
instability. By distinguishing between the king’s corporal existence
and the king’s legal person, Absolutist thinkers sought to stabilize
the process of monarchial succession and ensure legal stability upon
the king’s death.77
D. ‘Absolutism’ and Property Rights
In medieval England the monarch’s allodial ownership over
property was granted to each of its kings in their coronation
ceremony in accordance with the principles of primogeniture
hereditary succession.78 As a result, the ascendance to the throne of
a new monarch also marked a period of significant property
redistribution in accordance with the will of the newly anointed
sovereign.79 The formal justification for these acts of political
redistribution was that the Kings of England held a legal royal
dominion over all of the kingdom’s lands and property. In fact, the
king held the titles of all actual personal ownership of that property
and could determine who were his tenants. Consequently, all land
grants, patents, and royal court appointments or any other legal
permits that constituted acts of distributive justice were, in feudal
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times, limited to the life of the king and were subsequently
automatically revoked upon his death.80
In light of this inherent commercially unstable reality, the
adoption of the Absolutist theory by the English Crown during the
1550s had momentous ramifications. The influence of this
sovereignty theory upon the legal tradition of common law property
became immediately apparent. In contrast with medieval legal
theory, the Absolutist view held that the king, as the sole legitimate
head, both practically and figuratively, of the state was the lawful
allodial owner of all the land that belongs to it.81 Hence, the king’s
legal rights over the land of the state did not stem from his historical
factual possession of the land or alternatively, due to his corporal
hereditary inheritance, but rather from his authoritarian powers as
the head of the state.82 In accordance with this theory, even if the
king’s successor does not actually possess rights of primogeniture,
he was nonetheless the rightful owner of the crown’s properties by
attaining the legal position of head of state.83 In more abstract terms,
if in medieval England distributive justice was in fact redefined and
redistributed with each royal succession, in renaissance England, the
role of distributing justice was removed from the direct perview of
the actual corporal monarch and was subsequently assigned to the
king, as the head of the English state. This change allowd for greater
stability in the field of distributive justice and facilitated a more
independent sphere of commutative transactions.
The emergence of the Absolutist theory also provides a better
understanding of the gradual yet significant changes in the status of
sovereign authority over the judiciary and the lands of England that
occurred in the first half of the Sixteenth century. During the first
few decades of Henry VIII’s reign sovereign authority seemed to
emanate from the king’s own royal heritage;84 however, by the end
of his reign during the 1550s, the king and royal sovereignty came
to be perceived in a different light.85 The right of kings was still
80
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justified as a divine one, but the legal conception of monarchy had
developed.86 Henry was no longer only the sole rightful owner of
the lands of England but also the ‘head of the English State’ and his
sovereign legitimacy emanated from his role as the head of the
English body politic and not from his actual ownership of its lands.87
E. The Effect of ‘Absolutism’ on Rights in Copies in the Second
Half of the Sixteenth Century
The Absolutist theory also had a significant impact on the book
trade, although its real effects became apparent only after the death
of Henry VIII’s son Edward VI in 1553. In fact, it was the
subsequent ascendance of Mary to the throne and the counter
movement of the Court from Protestantism to Catholicism that
brought about this change.88 Within the first year of Queen Mary’s
reign, over half of the printers of London lost their printing rights,
while only a handful of privileges were either renewed or created
due to the Catholic ‘restoration’ that was taking place.89 After a fouryear period of legal vacillation, violent purges, and the general
uncertainty among the members of the London book trade, the
Catholic-leaning Stationers’ Company emerged as the dominant
entity in the realm of book printing.90 In 1557, Queen Mary decided
to grant the company an almost monopolistic right over book
printing.91 The grant stipulated that every owner of a printing press
in England must be a member of the Stationers’ Company unless he
was granted a direct superseding privilege from the monarch
himself.92 The grant transformed the Stationers’ Company from a
medieval guild to the de-facto regulator of the English book trade.93
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The Royal Charter of 1557 delegated the sovereign power of
‘privilege granting’ exclusively to the Stationers’ Company.94 This
act resulted in the transformation of the Stationers’ Company into a
quasi-administrative agency of the Crown.95 This delegation was
further reinforced by the fact that the new privileges were granted
on behalf of the company but were legally enforced by the Crown’s
Courts. This seemingly minor formal alteration in the title of the
granting authority might seem trivial, but it had a significant impact.
Privileges were no longer granted by a mortal person and therefore
limited to the duration of a king’s life, but rather by a royallysanctioned corporation.96 Thus, while sovereigns come and go, and
while the individual members of the company continuously joined
and eventually died, the company as a royally incorporated entity
was designed to endure. It could therefore grant privileges and
enforce legal obligations or rights far beyond the lifetime of any of
its individual members.97 Subsequently, the company could secure
in perpetuity the rights of its members in book copies.98 This
commercial stability stood in stark contrast with the old property
regime that was subject to the will of an idiosyncratic and transient
monarch. In abstract terms, this process can be seen as an attempt to
buttress the manner in which distributive justice dispenses privilege.
If we examine these changes from a sovereign perspective, the
Royal Charter of 1557 can be seen as the establishment of an entirely
new regime in the field of copyright. Although the Crown itself
became once removed from the formal process of granting rights,
the de-facto authority and control that the royal prerogative exerted
over the domestic book trade through the royally-sanctioned
Stationers’ Company was stronger than ever.99 In a practical sense,
the dispensation of distributive justice in the field of copyright
became insulated from the turbulent political reality of Sixteenth
94
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century England. This was achieved by entrusting this dispensation
procedure in the hands of a quasi-administrative professional body
that had a vested interest in promoting the commercial viability of
the book printing business.
Any prior rights in copies which were obtained before the
Charter were rendered invalid.100 The Queen vested the Stationers’
Company with exclusive authority over the registration of copies
and arbitration of property disputes between the individual owners
of those rights.101 Most importantly, the legal right in copies was not
limited to the life of the owner (in a life estate), or to a limited
duration (in an estate for years) but was granted as a fee simple.102
In short, the Charter was structured in light of a new vision of
monarchical rule and consequently, of distributive justice.103
Since all printing houses effectively became members of the
company, the company had to develop a way to mediate the various
competing interests of its numerous commercial stakeholders. To
achieve this goal, the company instated a fundamental rule that
would eventually become a hallmark of intellectual property: the
registration of copies.104 Each member of the company that wished
to publish a book had to visit the Stationers’ Hall to register their
rights in the copy.105 In a similar manner to the grant of royal
privileges under King Henry VIII, the company did not peruse the
nature or content of the work and its decision to allow registration
was purely based on commercial considerations.106 The Stationers’
Company simply granted a trade privilege and the printer was
expected to seek printing authorization for his book from the
ecclesiastic and political authorities who were permitted by the
Queen to license these works.107
Registration offered a monopoly over the copy and, to a certain
extent, over its content.108 Registration also allowed any printer to
100
101
102
103
104
105
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107
108
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inquire in advance whether the book he was planning to print was
already registered and more crucially, to validate his printing rights
in case of a dispute with another printer.109 The Royal Charter of
1557 also established an internal bureaucratic system to oversee the
process of copy registration, to facilitate transactions among the
members of the company and to arbitrate between disputing
printers.110 Clerks and wardens were assigned to monitor these tasks
and their operations were fully funded by the registration fees that
were collected from the individual members upon the registration of
their copies.111 All of these administrative mechanisms were
introduced in order to facilitate and regulate the commutative
voluntary exchange of goods between private merchants in the
newly established copyright market.112
F. The Routine Function of Copy Registration in
Elizabethan England
After the grant of the Charter, the Stationers’ Company
effectively became a printer’s guild.113 Every printer who sought
permission to print a book had to register their copy by entering the
Stationers’ Hall and presenting the book to one of the Stationers’
wardens.114 The warden’s task was to determine if the submitted
work would trespass upon the pre-registered rights of another
copy.115 In reaching this determination, the warden had to evaluate
whether the newly submitted copy was, in fact, an act of piracy—
the printing of a registered copy without authorization.116 If the copy
was deemed worthy of registration, the clerk would make an entry
in the register as well as in the procedural notebook of the clerk.117
The printer had to pay the clerk’s fee and received a receipt in the
form of a parchment that ensured his registration.118
109
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In this context, a second important distinction must be made:
entry in the register was not necessary to enable printing and
publication, and only safeguarded the right in the copy and allowed
the possibility of judicial relief.119 The registration of a copy in fact,
did not create the chattel itself; that is, the actual manuscript and no
such sort of legal fiction was ever recognized or endorsed. Instead,
certification granted access to sovereign remedial justice.120 The act
of registration was considered as a contract in which the printer pays
a registration fee in exchange for sovereign protection and a
guarantee that the courts of law will recognize a cause of action and
will police the rights in the copy in a case of pirating.121 Most
notably, this right in property was in fee simple and could also be
conveyed to another or even mortgaged, similarly to any other form
of common law property.122
G. The Legal Jurisdiction of the Stationers’ Bench
Since the Stationers’ Company had a de facto monopoly upon
the creation of rights in copies and in facilitating the exchange of
property rights in publications among its members, it naturally
followed that this Company was also endowed with some judicial
authority, namely, in resolving ownership disputes.123 This dispute
resolution procedure was administered by the Stationers’ Bench, a
quasi-juridical body that consisted of distinguished members of the
company as well as its chief wardens.124 In cases of disputed
ownership, it was the duty of the moving party, a stationer alleging
the equivalent of modern-day infringement, to provide the Bench
119
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with evidence that they owned the disputed copy, the correlated
license to print it, and a valid registration of the copy in the
Stationers’ Register.125 The vast majority of cases were relatively
simple. Any printer that attempted to print or register a copy that
was already in the register could be brought in front of the
Stationers’ Bench and held accountable for his infringement.126 In
simple cases the members of the bench only had to review the
clerk’s minutes of the original registration and decide the case after
the opposing parties presented their oral argument.127 This system
was extremely efficient and practical because the bench had
immediate access to self-authenticating evidence of ownership of
copy in the form of the Stationers’ Register which served as
undisputed proof of valid ownership. In addition to its quasi-judicial
role in resolving ownership disputes, the Company was tasked with
the daily administrative role of overseeing the assignment and
transfer of the ownership in copies from one stationer to another.128
This transactional procedure was procedurally similar to the
registration of a new copy and the transaction itself was sanctioned
and deemed valid only if it was overseen by one of the Company’s
wardens which was tasked with making an official revision of the
original ownership entry in the register record.129
From a theoretical perspective, the Company created a legally
sanctioned procedural framework that facilitated both private
transactions between the individual members of the Company and
an effective enforcement mechanism that secured the property rights
of these members in their copies. In essence, the entire registry
system was designed to ensure the voluntary exchange of
commensurable goods between two private individuals.130 This
regulatory framework also explains the severe prohibition that
existed in those days to transfer these rights to copies without
official Company oversight. This prohibition not only served as a
measure that prevented nefarious acts such as the involuntary
125

See C. J. Sisson, The Laws of Elizabethan Copyright: The Stationers’ View, 15 THE
LIBR. 8, 10–11 (1960).
126
Id. at 10.
127
Id. at 18.
128
Id. at 15–16.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 15, 18.

2018]

A TALE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERALISM

1379

exchange of property between individual members of the Company,
but more fundamentally ensured that all individual transactions were
both commensurable and voluntary.131
H. Appealing to the Court of Chancery and the Private Transfer
of Rights
In rare cases, disputes could be appealed from the Stationers’
Bench to the Court of Chancery.132 The benefit of appealing to the
Court of Chancery, apart from getting a second chance at prevailing
in the suit, was that intrinsic evidence could be introduced into the
record in order to question the Stationers’ Bench prior decision.133
Such intrinsic evidence could potentially undermine the Company’s
records or establish a remedy in cases of irregularities in the
registration procedure.
Modern research has discovered a number of cases from the
Elizabethan period which have been pursued in the Court of
Chancery.134 One of these cases serves as a good illustration of the
complex nature of these disputes. It involved an attempt to transfer
the right in a copy of one stationer to another privately and without
the Stationers’ authority by bypassing the official process of
registering the transaction in the Company’s register according to
standard procedure.135 Although one can only speculate, it seems
that the primary motivation for this illicit transfer had to do with the
nature of the intended transfer. As was previously noted, rights in
copies were granted in the form of fee simple property and remained
in the exclusive possession of the printer until his death, upon which,
the copy along with the rest of his inheritance was transferred to his
beneficiaries.136 The printer could alternatively transfer his rights in
the copy to another printer but such action amounted to complete
131
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alienation that foreclosed any possibility of reverter or “term of
years” transfer.137 In light of these restrictions, the attempted private
transfer that was documented in this specific case can be understood
as an attempt to undermine the Stationers’ system by limiting the
transfer itself to a specified amount of printed copies. In other words,
the original owner of the copy granted another printer the right to
print a limited amount of copies in exchange for a sum of money
without giving up his rights in it. This transaction could be equated
to a modern license in patent. It remains unclear why such licensing
was itself forbidden, but it seems that it emanated from a concern
that such a license would lessen the future value of the copy due to
excessive printing.
Another potential motivation of the parties in the case was
perhaps to avoid the payment of the transfer fee which was imposed
by the Stationers’ warden upon the parties when they registered the
transfer of rights in the Stationers’ Hall.138 In other words, the
private contract might have been a simple attempt to circumvent the
Company’s regulations.
Notwithstanding the contracting parties’ original motivation, the
suit which was brought by them against the Stationers’ Company
was transformed by their counsel into a full-fledged attempt to
challenge the prevailing notion that the assignment of copies was a
public transaction that had to be supervised by the Company and
required the Company’s agreement for an absolute transfer of the
copy.139 In essence, the suit attempted to establish the equitable
validity of a private contract between two voluntary contracting
parties despite the lack of official documentation and procedure. In
a more theoretical sense, the appealing party questioned the
distributive authority which was bestowed upon the Stationers’
Company by a royal grant to delineate the legal contours of the
private commutative exchange of rights in book copies.
The reasoning of the court in dismissing this suit is noteworthy
because it further elucidates the relationship between sovereignty
and property during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In
137
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its decision, the court reiterated the notion that any two parties are
free to contract in order to transfer ownership in property.140
However, this right is limited and circumscribed if the property in
question enjoys any sovereign protection in regulation.141 Therefore,
if the copy was never registered in the Company’s Register, there
may be no restriction on the assignment of copy.142 But from the
moment the printer decided of his own accord to register his copy in
the Stationers’ Register, he entered into a binding contract with the
Company (with the registration fee as consideration).143 The
contract endowed the printer with an exclusive monopoly right in
the copy and in exchange the company was granted the sole
authority to oversee and police the author’s rights in the property.144
In other words, the Court did not question the ability of two parties
to contract freely in order to transfer goods but denied the ability of
two parties to contract in order to transfer rights. Theoretically, the
Court asserted that the commutative rights that existed in registered
book copies was intrinsically dependent upon the sovereignly
sanctioned distributive mechanisms that facilitated this type of
commutative exchange in the first place.
In light of this decision, the second and private agreement
between the printers violated the terms of the initial contract
between the printer and the company. The decision highlights the
assertion that the royal courts did not perceive the Company as the
creator of the property right in the tangible manuscript itself but
rather as the creator and facilitator of a market for copies.145
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE SHIFTING CONCEPTION OF
RIGHTS IN PROPERTY
A. The Demise of ‘Absolutism’ and the Rise of Populism
In the early 1600s, England gradually sank into a constitutional
crisis that would eventually result in the regicide of 1648.146
Mounting pressure from both Parliament and the judiciary limited
the scope of monarchical sovereignty by questioning the supremacy
of the king and his divine or absolutist right.147 As part of this effort,
the absolutist theory of sovereignty also came under direct attack. In
Parliament, a growing number of members questioned the
theoretical basis that justified the king’s supremacy over the court
by developing a new ‘populist’ theory of the state.148 At the same
time, judges and legal theorists disputed the royal origins of the
English common law.149
Both efforts would also have a significant influence on the laws
of copyright and the fate of the Stationers’ Company. The advocates
of Parliamentarian supremacy would eventually transfer the
authority to police the rights in copies and patents from the Crown
to Parliament by the 1660s and the proponents of judicial
independence would reject the validity of the contracts which were
created in the name of the king in the ensuing century.150 This
dramatic shift in political authority eventually reconfigured the field
of copyright law into a system that resembles to a great extent the
framework of contemporary intellectual property jurisprudence.
B. Judicial Jurisdiction and the Royal Prerogative
The first significant legal critique of the Crown was levied by
Sir Edward Coke in the early decades of the 17th century. As Chief
146

Traditionally, the roots of this sovereign crisis are traced to the fundamental conflict
between King and Parliament over taxation and, in particular, over the growing reluctance
of the English magnates to fund the Crown’s wars with Spain. But the crisis was also fueled
by the Common Law Court’s ever-growing assertion of judicial autonomy and claims of
legal independence from the Crown. See SMITH, supra note 35, at 168–75.
147
Id. at 249.
148
See John Barnard, London Publishing 1640–1660: Crisis, Continuity and Innovation,
4 BOOK HIST. 1, 2–5 (2001).
149
See SMITH, supra note 35, at 12.
150
See PATTERSON, supra note 132, at 6–7.

2018]

A TALE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERALISM

1383

Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, Coke rejected the notion that
the king was entitled to decide cases that were brought before the
court.151 Coke also claimed that it was the common law that
protected the king and not the king that defended the common
law.152 Later, as Chief Justice of England, Coke continued to
challenge the royal prerogative by triggering a series of infamous
jurisdictional disputes that demanded the King’s personal
intervention. From his seat at the bench, Coke asserted that the
supremacy of the common law was derived from his perception of
it as a continuous body of law, handed down and developed since
the pre-Norman conquest and which was in itself the most accurate
reflection of the natural law.153 Coke’s views were deliberately
based upon a distorted adaptation of the history of English common
law and served him in his personal ambitious plan to undermine the
authority of James.154 But falsified history does not necessarily
make a bad argument and Coke’s celebrated opposition to James as
well as his extremely popular legal writings were an invaluable
intellectual contribution to the political enemies of King James who
sought to limit the scope of sovereign authority. More abstractly,
Coke argued, contrary to both Aristotle and Aquinas, that
commutative justice ontologically predates any form of distributive
justice and that the ‘natural’ commutability of common law
principles is the jurisprudential foundation of any form of positive
law.
In the decades that followed, Coke’s persuasive and daring
assertions came to galvanize the notion that the common law was
both older and superior to the will of the king and became accepted
as a historical fact that was merely obscured by the relatively recent
and constant tyrannical abuse of the Tudor and Stuart Absolute
monarchs.155 In the broader perspective, Coke was also the first legal
thinker that established a direct logical connection between the
151
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origin of property and the scope of the royal prerogative. This
logical connection would be further substantiated by John Locke,
albeit in the context of a more sophisticated theory regarding the
origin of property.156
C. Populism and Parliamentary Supremacy
Shortly after this frontal assault from the Bench, in 1616 Coke
joined Parliament. Here he united with a group of vocal critics of the
Crown who espoused similar anti-Absolutist views.157 This group
would be later known as the Levellers, a political movement that
emphasized popular sovereignty and the sovereign primacy of
Parliament and its representatives over the King.158 In 1628, Coke
and his allies in Parliament introduced the ‘Petition of Right’ as a
response to Charles I’s attempt to enforce “forced loans” upon the
members of Parliament in order to finance his military
expeditions.159 The ‘Petition of Right’ set out in clear and
unambiguous terms what Coke considered as the pre-existing rights
of Englishmen to be free from martial law, billeting of soldiers, nonParliamentary taxation and imprisonment without cause.160 Charles
initially rejected the petition but the pressure of Parliament
ultimately forced him to ratify it. By ratifying the petition, the king
had to fundamentally acknowledge the existence of a number of
cardinal individual rights on which he could not infringe and the
scope of the royal prerogative was greatly reduced.161 In essence,
the ‘Petition of Right’ can also be seen as the first instance in which
an official legal document implicitly acknowledged the notion that
certain common law commutative rights predate and are therefore
exempt from any form of sovereign distributive intervention.
In parallel to these legislative efforts, Coke and his fellow preLevellers espoused the view that the ‘Petition of Right’ merely
reinstated the fundamental rights which were already recognized by
the Kings of England following the ratification of the Magna
156
157
158
159
160
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Carta.162 Some legal historians described this polemical view as the
moment in which “The Myth of Magna Carta” was established and
observed that “It was an age in which historical discoveries were
received with credulity and in which the canons of historical
criticism were yet unformulated.”163 The unadulterated mingling of
politics and faux historical research, although recognized as such by
many of Coke’s contemporaries, remained largely unchallenged due
to the mounting popular pressure in Parliament to curtail the deeply
incompetent King.164 Coke and his supporters not only managed to
establish The Myth of Magna Carta among their contemporaries, but
almost surprisingly, the myth itself was perpetuated in later years by
new waves of jurists and politicians that might have deemed
themselves more critical and will be examined in the next Sections
of this Note.165
This political achievement also brought about a significant shift
in the perception of property and its relation to sovereignty. Prior to
the 1640s, property rights were widely conceived as rights that were
conferred upon individuals by the sovereign.166 But in his polemics,
Coke made the now infamous assertion that, “A man’s house is his
castle.”167 This proclamation sought to sever the connection
between the state and personal property and portrayed the sovereign
not as the fountainhead of property rights but rather as the most
significant threat to these rights.168 Essentially, Coke asserted that
sovereign distributive justice seeks to disrupt and undermine the
natural tranquility that is the cornerstone of private commutative
justice.
D. The End of Royal Control Over Property Rights and Law
The second stage in the development of the counter Absolutist
thought emerged during the 1630s and 1640s and was led by
162
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political thinkers such as John Milton, Richard Overton, and Henry
Parker.169 These thinkers represented similar but distinct strands of
political thought.
Milton and Overton adopted a radical ‘populist’ position as part
of their political association with the Levellers by arguing that the
seat of ultimate sovereign supremacy must be located with the
people and not with the king.170 These radical populists argued that
the source of sovereignty is located with the people of England, or
the body politic, and that the only form of legitimate government
was that which was established by popular elections. Thus, they
subverted the Absolutist head-body metaphor by asserting that it
was the role of the body to both elect and if necessary reject its head
through the process of democratic elections.171
Henry Parker, with his theory of representation, espoused a more
moderate view that championed the sovereign primacy of
Parliament over both the king and the common people.172 The
moderate Parliamentarians also located the source of ultimate
sovereignty with the people but rejected the argument that elections
ensured equitable representation. Instead, these thinkers held that
the best way to promote the interest of the body politic was by
figurative representation in Parliament. Figurative representation
meant that the unelected members of Parliament must in their
actions as members seek to represent the will of the people and strive
to promote the common welfare of the body politic. This growing
populist sentiment was ultimately coupled with the Lords’ outrage
over the King’s taxations and led to the break of the Civil War in
1642.173
The aftermath of the Civil War produced a dramatic rift in
English legal and constitutional landscape. For practical reasons,
this work will not discuss the tumultuous period of the war itself nor
the immediate period that led to the Glorious Revolution in great
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detail. Rather, this Section will briefly focus on the impact of those
events on England in the decades that followed.
The years that led up to the Civil War were marked by a
simultaneous assault upon the royal prerogative. Both the common
law courts and Parliament laid claim to sovereign supremacy by
developing competing political theories. These constitutional
conflicts ultimately resulted in the institution of Parliamentary
superiority following the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the
ratification of the ‘Bill of Rights’ in 1689. The passage of the bill
significantly limited the scope of the royal prerogative and instituted
Parliament as the seat of ultimate sovereignty. Although the
Judiciary Bench failed to secure its primacy in the constitutional
scheme, the common law courts also achieved significant
independence from the royal prerogative, even if in truth, the courts
effectively exchanged one master with another by becoming more
dependent upon Parliament.174
All of these remarkable changes also produced a new property
regime that would have been unrecognizable to a sixteenth century
Englishmen who lived in the early 1600s. It was no longer the king
who controlled the dispensation of land and taxation through his
royal prerogative, but the Parliament that had an ultimate say in
matters of property. By 1689, it became clear that the source of
sovereignty and hence distributive justice in England was the
Parliament.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PROPERTY REGIME
A. The Property Regime Under Parliamentarian Rule
As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, prior to the late 17th century
the word “revolution” was strictly tied to its original astronomical
meaning, which signified the eternal, irresistible, ever-recurring
motion of the heavenly bodies.175 As a star that completes its
revolution around the sun in the same precise place of initial
departure, when the word was first invoked in the English political
context during the 1660s— its use was metaphorical and served to
174
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describe a movement or a swing back to a pre-ordained order.176 The
Glorious Revolution of 1688 was therefore envisioned by its
architects as a reactionary act by which the lawful King of England
would once again be recognized as the pinnacle of sovereign
dominion.177 But perhaps ironically, the Glorious Revolution which
formally intended to restore monarchial power to its former
righteousness and glory, actually brought about significant
constitutional changes which would have been practically
unimaginable to Elizabethan Absolutist observers.178 In fact, the
Glorious Revolution proved to be much more ‘revolutionary’ from
the way it was portrayed to the observing public.179
These changes were most radical and apparent in the field of
property law. The ‘Bill of Rights’ of 1689 was enacted in order to
limit the scope of the royal prerogative in property matters.180 The
Bill restricted the crown’s ability to levy taxes without Parliaments’
consent or to impose fines and fortitudes in the absence of due
process. These limitations were coupled with another significant
financial constraint upon the Crown. Up until the 1690s, the
Exchequer issued royal tallies or debts of the crown against future
tax revenue. These tallies served as sovereign bonds and provided
the king with liquidity. The issuance of tallies was within the
exclusive purview of the crown and provided it with a reliable means
of remaining solvent at times of crisis. The formation of the Bank of
England in 1694 marked the end of this independent practice and the
issuance of tallies had to be approved by Parliament.181 These two
acts serve as the most potent examples of how the crown was
stripped of any meaningful tool of controlling and regulating
property in the immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution.
Concurrently, Parliament gained unprecedented control over
property matters and secured its position as the ultimate authority in
these affairs.182 But Parliament, which was effectively controlled by
176
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the landed gentry and England’s magnets, also sought to limit the
power of the state to regulate their own property. As a result, both
the ‘Bill of Rights’ and further legislation in the field of property
law imposed restrictions on the ability of the sovereign to forfeit
property absent proper legal process.183
As in the days of Coke, many of the members of Parliament
promoted their own financial interest by attempting to galvanize the
‘sanctity’ of private property.184 In this respect, this political faction
perceived Locke’s labor theory as a powerful conceptual vehicle
through which they could support their own self-interest.185
B. Locke’s Labor Theory
As mentioned in the introduction, Locke’s theory proved
extremely helpful in cementing the theoretical justifications for the
significant changes that took place in the 1690s. In a similar manner
to the general perception of the Revolution, it was vital for Locke
that his theory would be accepted as ‘reinstituting’ the English
system of property to its ‘original’ historical roots.186 In this sense,
his theory provided a innovative yet ultimately fictitious account of
property, disguised as a much-needed return to the traditional
English precepts of property. In his writings, Locke sought to
reconstruct a myth concerning the formation of English property
rights and the establishment of the English constitution, much as
Coke had done 50 years prior.187
Locke first theorized as to what was the ‘natural’ manner by
which property is brought about. According to his account, property
was created through individual labor, whether it be cultivation of
land, the creation of objects or even hunting.188 To protect their
property, individuals gradually formed communities or
governments that utilize the power of the many in providing such
protections. In Locke’s view, it therefore logically followed that the
chief duty of any government to provide such protection is to its
183
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citizens and that any government which blatantly breached this duty
was deemed despotic and illegitimate.189
In his Second Treatise, Locke attempted to demonstrate that this
natural phenomenon was in fact the actual historical way by which
the English nation and its common laws were first formed. He
argued that the Saxon people established the English Crown in order
to protect their private properties from Nordic invasions and that it
was the role of the Saxon Kings to protect their subjects from
wrongful appropriation.190 In his works, Locke further insisted that
even the Norman conquest of England did not in any way abolish
the allegedly self-evident and natural property rights of Englishmen
in their lands and property:
We are told by some, that the English monarchy is founded in
the Norman conquest, and that our princes have thereby a title to
absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as, by history, it appears
otherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island;
yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the
Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of England. The
Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all
descended from them, are freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let
that give what dominion it will. And if I, or anybody else, shall claim
freedom, as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the
contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no distinction
between one and the other, intends that there should not be any
difference in their freedom or privileges.191
Locke therefore vehemently denied that it was the sovereign
who was the ultimate owner of all the property in England. Instead
Locke claimed that, historically he was a mere custodial agent that
was tasked with guarding and guaranteeing the private rights in
property of the English people.192
In addition, due to this fact, Locke concluded that all property
owners possessed ultimate jurisdiction over their private property
with only some very narrow exceptions.193 The most notable being
189
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that they should not infringe upon the rights of another
Englishman.194 In his account, however, the limits that are imposed
upon this private right do not emanate from a centralized sovereign
decision to promote the rather abstract common good through
distributive justice. Rather, he argued that any limitation on private
property emanates from a concrete or potential injury to another
individual or his property.195 In accordance with this understanding,
the role of the government in regulating property is therefore limited
to resolving disputes among private owners of property and
protecting the rights of citizens from injurious uses of property by
other individuals.196 More abstractly, the role of the sovereign is
limited to overseeing the equitable administration of commutative
justice among the private individuals that are under its dominion.197
In Locke’s account, the role of distributive justice is entirely
obscured. It only comes into play in the original allocation of goods
prior to the formation of the government, that is, in the state of
nature. Crucially, this understanding leaves very little room for the
government to regulate private property in light of what it
determines to be the common good. This is due to the fact that such
action is distributive and any governmental regulation should only
be made in light of protecting individual interest and not for the
“benefit of the community.”198
In the pragmatic political context, Locke’s theory was utilized
to introduce new legislation that broadened the private rights of
citizens in their property and promoted the introduction of new
privately owned institutions such as the Bank of England.199 For
example, during the debates surrounding the ‘Four Percent Bill’ of
1692, Locke was encouraged by Sir John Somers to argue for the
merits of opposing the Bill which sought to enforce government
regulation on privately serviced interest rates.200
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Locke and his fellow Whig reformers in the early years of the
Hanoverian rule of England were also greatly influenced by the
Dutch society and wanted to emulate to a great extent this vibrant
financial center of Europe.201 This political faction that established
itself as the Whig party in Parliament was deeply disturbed by the
centralist-authoritarian rule of Louis XIV of France and identified
his regime as antithetical to their vision of a liberal civic society.202
Locke and his allies in Parliament envisaged a liberal society
without legal barriers to the advance of the individual (so long as
they were Protestant). Their political action was aimed at improving
domestic and foreign trade and establishing London as a financial
capital that was free from what they considered as cumbersome and
corrupt sovereign oversight.203 In addition, they promoted
legislation that would weaken the grip of the central government
over trade and commerce by constructing through laws, a politicaleconomic framework that better resembled the Dutch model of a
weak central government and robust privately owned
corporations.204
The implied ideology that animated all of this vigorous political
activity was that private wealth was good and could be earned by
talent and hard work, and that given the right encouragement,
individuals seeking their own good would create wealth and
prosperity in this new competitive world. More fundamentally, this
ideology was bolstered by a theoretical framework that championed
the primacy of commutative justice and the perceived inherent
commercial oppression of the absolutist form of distributive justice,
which was identified as an antiquated scholastic remnant of the Dark
Ages and their corollary tyrannical feudal regimes.205 Locke not
only argued for the replacement of the sovereign entity that
administered distributive justice but also for the supremacy of the
laws of private commutative justice over the positive laws of the
willing sovereign whether it be a monarch or a democratically
201
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elected parliament.206 Hence, in his eyes Parliament should replace
the role of the Crown as ultimate sovereign, but nonetheless,
Parliament’s laws should always be subordinate to the superior
“self-evident” natural edicts of the common law.207
C. Copyright Law in the Aftermath of the Civil War and the
Licensing Acts of the 1690s
All of these significant shifts in political philosophy and policy
had a substantial impact upon the London book trade and most
especially, upon the Stationers’ Company. The first wave of
parliamentary legislation in the field of copyright was enacted
during the Restoration Period of the 1670s.208 In the strictest
technical sense, this legislation simply reinstated the principles and
rules of the licensing system that existed prior to the eruption of the
Civil War. However, some significant changes were implemented.
The new legislation became tied to a stricter censorship regime that
was enforced in order to silence any perceived opposition to the
newly instated Catholic Stuart monarchs.209 The Kings of this era,
Charles II and James II, were deeply influenced by their French
cousin and ally, King Louis XIV, and their efforts to heavily regulate
the press were derived to a great extent from their personal ambition
plan to quell any hint of internal opposition to their Absolute rule.210
As a result, these new laws imposed a great burden upon the book
trade. During the 1670s and 1680s, printers and other Stationers’
workshops were frequently raided by agents of the Secretary of State
and many manuscripts were confiscated and seized by order of the
courts for containing potentially treasonous materials.211 Extreme
yet relatively frequent cases involving writings which were
considered by the authorities treasonable, resulted in more severe
punishment. Some printers were imprisoned and a number of them
were eventually executed.212
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The majority of these persecutions were considered as an
integral part of the overall concerted effort of the Tories in
Parliament and the King’s Courts to restrict the power of the Whigs
over the English press. Executions were therefore reserved for those
pro-Whig printers who sought to publish works that denied the
legitimacy of King Chalres II’s Catholic rule over England.213 As
opposed to the flourishing book trade of the tolerant Dutch, the
English printers found themselves in the midst of a tense and at
times violent, political conflict that turned their profession into a
notoriously dangerous one.214 Printers had to be very careful in
constructing their political alliances and many of them decided for
political and economic reasons to become loyal to the Tories and
their Francophile Catholic King.
The Revolution of 1688 brought about yet another dramatic shift
in the political balance of England in which the Whigs gained
complete control of the Crown and the government. Suddenly, the
Stationers who remained loyal to James II and in particular those
who were Catholics, were prosecuted by Parliament and the
courts.215 Some of these printers were imprisoned because they were
deemed to be radical Jacobites who sought to bring about the return
of the exiled Stuarts, but none of them were executed.216 Instead,
Locke and his Whig allies in Parliament attempted to curtail the
authority of the Stationers’ Company, which they identified as a
bastion of support to the old Catholic regime.217
In 1692, the Tory Party in Parliament was nonetheless able to
pass a Licensing Act with the support of some centrist Whigs.218 The
Tories were traditional backers of the Stationers’ Company and
recognized that the Licensing Act was the key legal instrument to
protect the Company’s commercial interest.219 Surprisingly, the
centrist Whigs supported this legislation because it also included
censoring provisions that enabled the Stationers and the courts to
213
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regulate the press by weeding out Jacobite members of the trade.220
But this coalition was fragile and relied upon the partisan
cooperation of two political factions that were essentially at odds
with each other.221
The opposition to the Licensing Act of 1692 was composed from
the remaining majority of the Whig party in Parliament.222 The
Whigs opposed the Act for two main reasons. The predominant
reason was a political one: to limit the commercial and political
influence of the Stationers Company that they identified as a ToryCatholic leaning institution. The second motivation was
commercial: to break the perpetual monopolistic grip of the
individual members of the company over the copyrights they held
in lucrative canonical literary works. Ultimately, all the strong
opposition to the Bill due to its restricted support, the 1692 Act was
limited in duration and was set to lapse in 1695.223
Locke and his followers recognized this political opportunity
and immediately began to engage in lobbying efforts to ensure that
the Act would not be renewed without undergoing significant
alternation. To achieve this goal, Locke and his political allies
decided to dismantle the coalition that enabled the legislation to pass
in 1692. They did so by arguing that the matters of censorship and
copyright are distinct issues and that the Licensing Act should be
accordingly bifurcated into two separate bills that address both
matters separately.224
Without the support of the 1692 coalition, Parliament was
unable to renew the Act in 1695.225 The Tories failed to gather
sufficient Whig support to pass a bill that would only address the
concerns of the members of the Stationers Company.226 Meanwhile,
the moderate Whigs failed to recruit enough Tory backing to pass
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legislation that would provide the Hanoverian Whig King with a
powerful tool to prosecute their historical Catholic allies.227
Locke himself promoted an alternative copyright bill that would
greatly diminish the power of the Stationers’ Company, but this bill
proposal also failed to gain sufficient political traction.228
Nonetheless, it can be argued that Locke must have been greatly
satisfied with the outcome of his lobbying efforts. The lapse of the
Act in 1695 significantly damaged the Stationers’ Company.229 The
company’s register was no longer a legally binding official database and the Stationers’ century-old control over the regulation of
copyright in England was greatly diminished. In addition, the lapse
of the Act had de-facto introduced the notion of ‘free press’ in
England. Absent a legally sanctioned censoring mechanism, the
Crown was unable to prosecute or censor printers who were deemed
politically problematic.230
In short, the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution also marked
the end of the historical role of the Stationers’ Company in copyright
regulation. This end was the result of a significant change in
sovereign authority which greatly curtailed the scope of the Royal
prerogative.231 Absent Royal protection, the Company proved to be
an easy target to its commercial and political rivals. In this context,
it is also crucial to note that the sovereign changes of the 1680s and
90s did not produce a better or more efficient copyright regime.
Instead, the governmental vacuum that was created by the lapse of
the Licensing Act in 1695 resulted in a fifteen-year period of legal
and commercial chaos in the field of copyright.232 Without any
enforceable legal mechanism, pirating was rampant, and the English
book market collapsed into a disarrayed free-for-all.233 If anything,
this anarchic period attests to the commercial devastation that
ensues in the absence of sovereign distributive legal mechanisms.234
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Even if Locke honestly intended to protect the printers from
censorship and award authors with adequate compensation, the
sovereign vacuum of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries produced the opposite result.235 The breakdown of the
English book trade left the individual printers and authors legally
exposed and unprotected.236
D. The Statute of Anne and Its Immediate Implications
The lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695 had resulted in a great
depreciation in the political and commercial influence of the
Stationers’ Company. Without an effective enforcement
mechanism, the Company’s register was no longer routinely used by
printers who sought to protect their works.237 Many of the
Company’s individual members lost a great source of their revenue
due to pirating and had to limit the amount of copies they printed.
In addition, the English book market was flooded with cheap book
copies from the continent which had further damaged domestic
commerce. The Company made a number of attempts to persuade
Parliament to act but due to their diminished importance these
requests were largely disregarded.238
Nonetheless, during the early years of the 18th century, a
growing number of renowned authors such as Daniel Defoe and
Jonathan Swift began lobbying Parliament to enact new laws that
would protect their writings. Due to their disadvantaged
circumstance, the Stationers made a strategic decision to join this
effort and also argued that author’s works should receive
governmental protection.239 Thus, this newly formed coalition was
in essence, a union of two historic commercial adversaries under one
cause. But more importantly, it signaled a fundamental change in
the Stationers position concerning copyright law.240 First, due to
their diminished political influence the Stationers conceded that any
235
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form of legislation should primarily protect the rights of authors and
not of printers, as legislation in the field historically did.241 Second,
they cleverly framed this sovereign protection as stemming from the
Lockean principles of the labor theory of property and not as
emanating from the rights that were historically bestowed upon
them by the king over the ownership of copies.242 In other words, to
promote their short-termed commercial interest, the members of the
Stationers Company came to reject the primacy of the rights of
printers according to the old distributive regime and based their
claims upon the commutative principles of commensurate exchange.
This position ultimately alsovundermined their rightful claim to the
copies of the canonical works they traditionally held, but nontheless
it seems that this was a concession they were willing to make in
order to revive their threatened enterprise.243 Finally, the Stationers
supported the authors argument that legislation in the field is
necessary to promote the general welfare of the reading public and
abandoned the traditional position that it was necessary in order to
regulate the commercial field of book printing.244 All of these
concessions were made by necessity and reflect a rather desperate
attempt to restore some sort of order to their threatened trade.
After years of mounting pressure, the Copyright Act of 1710 was
enacted in April of that year. The Act contained a number of
important provisions. First, it sought to curtail the dissemination of
unlicensed and foreign books. Second, it was framed as “An Act for
the Encouragement of Learning.” Third, the Act transferred the right
in copies from the Stationers to the authors of the works. Fourth, it
limited the role of the Stationers’ Company: matters of pirating or
infringement were no longer under the jurisdiction of the company
but rather under the sole supervision of the courts.245 Finally, the Act
set a time limit on the protection that was afforded to new copies
and foreclosed the right to own copy rights in perpetuity. To reward
the Stationers for all the concessions they were willing to make, a
provision was made to protect the copies that were historically held
241
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by the company for an additional period of 21 years after which
these once perpetual rights would fall into the public domain.246
The Copyright Act of 1710 can be seen as a piece of legislation
that reconciled the interests of the Authors and the Stationers’
Company. The majority of the provisions in the Act manifested
Locke’s principles of the labor theory of property. The property
itself, referring to the written works, is created by the individual
author independently of any government intervention. Therefore,
the role of the legislation can be seen as regulating the actual
protection of this private property from wrongful usurpation for a
limited time.247 It is important to note that the Act did not clearly
distinguish between the protection of the tangible manuscript itself
and the intangible right over the circulation of copies of the
manuscript.248
However, the Act itself also contains two other provisions that
can be identified as stemming from a more traditional and
distributive understanding of property. In this sense, the Act can be
viewed as an ‘amphibious’ creature of the law. The first element that
manifests the hybridity of the Act is the section that states that the
law is enacted as “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning.” The
second element is of course the imposition of a limitation on the
time for which the copyright protection would be granted.249 Both
provisions contain traces of the traditional property maxim that
asserts that property is a positive right which is conferred by the
sovereign and establishes a legal relationship between an individual
and a legally recognized object.
Most importantly, the Act de facto rejected the Lockean proviso
concerning the imposition of limitations upon the possession of
private property. The ‘limited duration’ provision of the Act does
not stem from a concern for rights of other private individuals but in
order to promote the common good. In other words, the limitation is
imposed in accordance with the principles of ‘distributive’ and not
‘commutative’ justice. Although the Act adopted some of Locke’s
246
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language and also his views about the rights of authors in their
works, it outright rejected his theory of property.
The aftermath of the legislation marked a turning point for the
English book trade. New and more independent printers were able
to enter the market and the general situation of authors greatly
improved.250 The Stationers’ Company however, never returned to
its former glory and the registration of copies in the Company’s
Register did not increase in a significant way after the legislation
was enacted. Instead, the members of the Company found some
comfort in their renewed ability to control the printing of registered
classic works due to their historic exclusive rights in them.
Ultimately, the Statute expired in 1732 and led to the outbreak of
the “Battle of the Booksellers,” a second period of legal uncertainty
that was to last until the end of the 1770s and is discussed in greater
detail in Section III.E.251
E. Blackstone’s Conception of Intellectual Property
To fully understand Blackstone’s conception of intellectual
property it is essential to briefly trace the theoretical influences that
shaped his legal opinion. First, as many other eminent jurors of the
age, Blackstone was deeply influenced by Coke’s theory of the
common law and considered himself a staunch proponent of his
thinking.252 Blackstone supported the notion that common law was
based on custom, adopted voluntarily by the people of Britain and
predated the English monarchy.253 In addition, Blackstone echoed
Coke’s assertion that the common law is the most accurate reflection
of the natural law.254 This led him to declare that these common law
rights are “natural” in the legal sense and therefore cannot be
abrogated by the sovereign.255
Second, Blackstone supported Henry Parker’s position in
relation to Parliament’s supremacy. As part of this position,
250
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Blackstone maintained the view that Parliament was the seat of
ultimate sovereignty in England and that any law or judgment must
be executed only upon Parliament’s approval.256 This view of
Parliament was most popular amongst the English elite of that age.
In this context, it is crucial to note that as a supporter of Parker’s
views of representation, Blackstone was by no means a populist and
he had out rightly rejected the populist notion of popular
representation.257
Third, in the field of property, Blackstone generally adopted
Locke’s views by embracing his labor theory. As noted in Section
II.F, Locke’s theory fit rather neatly with Coke’s views on
sovereignty. In relation to the field of copyrights in particular,
Blackstone agreed with Locke that authors create their literary
works through labor and that it is the role of governments to protect
this form of intellectual property.258
At first glance, it seems that these three main propositions are
internally consistent and co-exist rather harmoniously but in fact,
they will prove to be contradictory and ultimately irreconcilable.
James Wilson, one of the founding fathers of the United States and
a renowned legal theorist, summed up Blackstone’s theoretical
inconsistencies in a precise manner:
“It is one of the characteristick marks of English
liberty,” says he [Blackstone], “that our common law
depends upon custom, which carries this internal
evidence of freedom along with it, that it probably
was introduced by the voluntary consent of the
people.” I search not for contradictions: I wish to
reconcile what is seemingly contradictory. But, if the
common law could be introduced, as it is admitted it
probably was, by the voluntary consent of the people;
I confess I cannot reconcile with this—certainly a
solid—principle, the principle that “A law always
supposes some superior, who is to make it,” nor
256
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another principle, that “sovereignty and legislature
are indeed convertible terms.”259
In this passage, Wilson respectfully points out to the fundamental
flaw in Blackstone’s view of the law and sovereignty. He observes
initially that Blackstone is a proponent of Coke and asserted the
‘naturalness’ and superiority of the common law. But he also
demonstrates that at the same time, Blackstone argued for the
supremacy of Parliament as the source and fountainhead of all laws.
In other words, in his theoretical writings Blackstone introduces a
conflict of laws and it is impossible to determine which of the two
sources of law, Parliament or the common law should prevail in the
case of any direct contradiction.260
Therefore, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it was this abstract and
theoretical conflict regarding notions of legal supremacy that
produced Blackstone’s confusing position on intellectual property
law which guided his actions during the great legal conflict that later
came to be known as the ‘Battle of the Booksellers.’ This notorious
and long-lasting legal conflict involved two factions of the book
market that represented two competing commercial interests. One
faction included established members of the Stationers’ Company
and authors who licensed their works to those printers.261 The
opposing side consisted of a rapidly growing number of independent
printers which had printed works that had ‘fallen’ into the public
domain in accordance with the 1710 Act.262 The Stationers’ faction
argued that the original authors of the works had a ‘natural’ and
perpetual common law right in their labor and that the provision in
the 1710 Act, which secured their rights for a limited period of 14
years, was violating this right. The independent printers argued that
the Act did not violate any such right and that they were fully
empowered to print these works in light of the statute.263
During the 1760s, Blackstone became actively involved in the
dispute as a barrister for the Stationers’ faction. In 1769, he
submitted the written argument on behalf of his client Millar, a
259
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wildly affluent Scottish publisher, in the case of Millar v. Taylor.264
Millar was extremely litigious and was a plaintiff in a number of
litigations concerning the matter of copyright protection during the
1750s and 60s. The gist of Blackstone’s argument in the case was
summed up by the court:
The Plaintiff insisted that there is a real property
remaining in authors, after publication of their works
and that they only, or those who claim under them
[licensed publishers], have a right to multiply the
copies of their literary property, and their pleasure,
for sale. And they likewise insisted, that this right is
a common law right, which always has existed, and
does still exist, independent of and not taken away by
the statute of 8 Anne c.19.265
In terms of sovereignty theory, this argument asserted the primacy
of the common law over the positive law of Parliament and the
superiority of ‘natural’ common law rights over positive rights that
are conferred by legislation.266 In contrary to the conflicting position
that was apparent in his writings upon the nature of English
sovereignty, as a barrister, Blackstone clearly advocated for the
supremacy of the common law over the positive laws of
government.
Perhaps unexpectedly, the court in the case ruled in favor of the
Plaintiff Millar. In his majority opinion, Sir Richard Aston directly
quoted a passage from Locke and concluded that:
[A] Man may have Property in his Body, Life, Fame,
Labours, and the like; and, in short, in anything that
can be called His: That it is incompatible with the
Peace and Happiness of Mankind, to violate or
disturb, by Force or Fraud, his Possession, Use or
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Disposal of those Rights; as well as against the
Principles of Reason, Justice, and Truth.267
Lord Mansfield, who previously served as counsel for another
copyright-holding publisher, filed a separate concurring opinion that
also asserted the supremacy of the common law and stated that
“what is agreeable to the natural principles is common-law; what is
repugnant to natural principles is contrary to common law” and
concluded that “ . . . it is agreeable to natural principles that an
author should have a copy of his own works . . .”268
Interestingly, Sir Joseph Yates, the sole dissenter in the case, did
not reject the constitutional or sovereign principle that underlined
the legal theory that was presented by Blackstone. Instead, he
merely disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the Act actually
violated the ‘natural’ and common law right of authors in their
works.269 In his dissenting opinion, Yates argued that while an
author does have natural rights in his works, he voluntarily forfeits
those rights to the world if he publishes the work and benefits from
the protection of the law. His opinion was also based on Locke’s
theory of property, but it took into consideration Locke’s proviso
that whilst individuals have a right to private property from nature
by working on it, they can do so only “at least where there is enough,
and as good, left in common for others”270:
Shall an Author’s Claim continue, without Bounds of
Limitation; and for ever restrain all the Rest of
Mankind from their natural rights, by an endless
Monopoly? Yet such is the claim that is now made;
a Claim to an exclusive Right of Publication, for
ever: For, nothing less is demanded as a Reward and
Fruit of the Author’s Labour, than an absolute
Perpetuity.271
Through his vigorous advocacy, Blackstone secured a
significant victory for the established publishers of London and for
267
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English authors in general.272 But in the wider context, Millar v.
Taylor can also be seen as a remarkable victory for the proponents
of the supremacy of the common law and attest to the potency of the
‘Myth of the Common Law’ which was first conceived by Coke
more than 150 years prior to this decision. It is impossible to discern
whether Blackstone’s advocacy was entirely motivated by his sense
of justice or from political expediency but it is clear that despite his
inability to reconcile the theoretical gap in his writings concerning
this conflict of laws, he was unhesitant to promote a persuasive legal
theory that clearly favored the common law.
F. The Demise of Common Law Copyright in England
Despite its decisiveness, the precedent set by Millar v. Taylor
lasted for less than five years. In February 1774, the case which was
heard at the Court of Chancery was appealed to the House of Lords
that also served as the court of final appeal.273 The twelve judges
that heard the case were asked to determine five questions: (1)
“Whether, at common law, an author of any book or literary
composition, had the sole right of first printing and publishing the
same for sale, and might bring an action against any person who
printed, published, and sold the same, without his consent?” (2) “If
the author had such right originally, did the law take it away upon
his printing and publishing such book or literary composition, and
might any person afterward reprint and sell, for his own benefit, such
book or literary composition, against the will of the author?” (3) “If
such action would have lain at common law, is it taken away by the
statute of 8th Anne: and is an author, by the said statute, precluded
from every remedy except on the foundation of the said statute, and
on the terms and conditions prescribed thereby?” (4) ”Whether the
author of any literary composition, and his assigns, had the sole right
of printing and publishing the same, in perpetuity, by the common
law?” and (5) “Whether this right is any way impeached, restrained,
or taken away, by the statute 8th Anne?”274
In the most abstract sense, questions (1), (2), and (4) concerned
the nature of books and literary works as property, while questions
272
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(3) and (5) were constitutional questions that concerned the
supremacy of positive statutory law.
Despite his apparent conflict of interest, Blackstone decided not
to recuse himself and served as one of the judges that opined in the
case and found in favor of the plaintiff, in accordance with his
previous advocated position in the lower court.275 In essence,
Blackstone reaffirmed the constitutional principle that the common
law is supreme and therefore should preempt any positive law that
directly contradicted it.276 With regard to the nature of copyright
property, Blackstone reiterated his position that any book or literary
composition constitutes common law property. In light of these two
assertions, Blackstone concluded that the Statute of Anne
unlawfully usurped the right of authors in the works in question.277
However, Blackstone’s view was the minority opinion in the
case. Both the majority of the twelve judges, as well as the House of
Lords, ruled in favor of the defendant in the case.278 The majority of
the judges in the case did not submit a uniform opinion and some of
the majority judges disagreed about the correct answers in response
to the five questions presented. Nonetheless, two of the opinions,
those of Lord Chief Justice De Grey and Lord Camden, are of
particular interest.
Lord Chief Justice De Grey found that although a common law
property right existed over the tangible manuscript produced by the
author, this common law right did not extend as far as to protect any
additional intangible right in subsequent printed works produced in
accordance with the original manuscript.279 In addition, De Grey
found that at any rate, the positive law of Parliament was supreme
and that it legitimately abrogated any preexisting ‘natural’ or
common law right. Interestingly, similar to Blackstone’s, De Grey’s
analysis concerning the nature of books and literary works was
Lockean in its nature.280 He concluded that manuscripts are tangible
275
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objects that should be awarded the protection of the common law.
But since Locke never settled the question of whether the legal status
of intangible and tangible objects was the same, De Grey and
Blackstone interpretations of Locke’s labor theory differed in
respect to this question. In addition, De Grey conducted an extensive
historical research to determine whether a common law right in
books or literary works ever existed in England.281 In his opinion,
De Grey concluded that:
What is common law now, must have been so 300
years ago, when printing was invented. No traces of
such a claim are to be met with prior to the
Restoration. Very few cases of this kind happened in
Charles 2d’s time, or before the licensing act, and
those few were determined upon the prerogative
right of the crown. The executive power of the crown
drew after it this prerogative right, which extended to
all acts of parliament, matters of religion, and acts of
state.282
De Grey’s legal research was commendable and can be said to
withstand the test of time. However, his interpretation of this legal
history sheds light on the way Locke’s conception of property
became so pervasive by the end of the 18th century that it obscured
any other understanding of the fundamental concept of property. De
Grey’s analysis failed to recognize that a royal prerogative right
was, in fact, the sovereign juridical mechanism by which property
was legally constructed and ultimately realized in pre-Civil War
England. In other words, no common law right existed in books
since property itself was not conceived as a creature of the common
law, but rather a right that was conferred by the sovereign.
This exact distinction concerning the legal construction of
property that De Gray faild to observe in his opinion was brilliantly
summarized by Thomas Hobbes during the Civil War:
And you cannot deny but there must be law-makers,
before there were any laws, and consequently before
there was any justice, (I speak of human justice); and
281
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that law-makers were before that which you call
own, or property of goods or lands, distinguished by
meum, tuum, alienum . . . You see then that no
private man can claim a propriety in any lands, or
other goods, from any title from any man but the
King, or them that have the sovereign power;
because it is in virtue of the sovereignty, that every
man may not enter into and possess what he pleaseth;
and consequently to deny the sovereign anything
necessary to the sustaining of his sovereign power, is
to destroy the propriety he pretends to.283
As this Note already demonstrated, prior to the Civil War no
juridical distinction had to be made between royal grants and private
property. In fact, from a strict legal perspective, these two terms
were indistinguishable. It is unsurprising that in his extensive
research De Grey found that these historical decisions “[do] not say
a word of property.”284
Most importantly, it is once again crucial to note that these two
different definitions of property bare significant implications on the
understanding of sovereignty. In his research, De Grey directly
encountered the legal argument that “property [is] founded on [the
royal] prerogative,” but concluded that such an argument “however
allowable for counsel, [is] not very admissible by, or intelligible to,
a judge.”285 It is possible to argue that De Grey’s remarks in this
context were not honest, and that the Lord Chief Justice was well
aware of the historical legal validity of this argument. In other
words, he well understood that accepting this prerogative based
argument as valid would undermine the prevailing constitutional
understanding of property. This, in turn, would imply that the seat
of ultimate sovereignty is after all the Crown and not Parliament or
the courts. However, this possible explanation is merely speculative
and it is more likely that De Grey was not entirely familiar with the
nature of the pre-Civil War legal scheme.
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Much has been written in recent years about this case and about
the role of the common law in the regulation of intellectual property
in 18th century England.286 A number of the scholars that have
researched the case and its history are divided upon the question of
whether the House of Lords decided that a common law right in
intangible works of intellectual property existed historically. It
might be the case that a definitive answer to this question would
never be found but it is unquestionable that the House of Lords
decided that regardless of whether such a common law right existed,
the positive law of Parliament abrogated it.
In addition, this Note seeks to establish that the question of
whether the House of Lords found that such a right ‘existed’ and the
question of whether such a right actually historically existed are two
important but ultimately separate questions.287 In this context, this
Note suggests that such a common law right surely did not exist
prior to the Civil War and probably did not exist prior to the
publication of Locke’s Second Treaties in 1689. Given the
circumstances, it is also reasonable to speculate that both Blackstone
and the plaintiff in the case did not have direct historical evidence
such as court records or decisions that indicated the actual existence
of such a right prior to the Glorious Revolution. They instead relied
upon a more equitable argument that was based upon the persuasive
ideology of Coke, Locke, and their theoretical successors. But, in
fact, Lord Camden’s opinion in the case makes clear that at least
some of the Lord’s were familiar with the pre-revolution legal
scheme:
The arguments attempted to be maintained on the
side of the respondents, were founded on patents,
286

E.g., Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008); Craig W.
Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring
the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 413–15, 424 (2004); H. Tomás GómezArostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the InadequateRemedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (2008); Edmund W.
Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 293, 295 n.12 (1992);
Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
272, 335 (2004); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1987); Catherine Seville, The Statute of Anne: Rhetoric and Reception in the
Nineteenth Century, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 819, 824–27 (2010).
287
Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 4 Burr. 2408, 7 P.C. 88 (H.L. 1774).

1410 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:1357

privileges, Star Chamber decrees, and the bye [sic]
laws of the Stationers’ Company; all of them the
effects of the grossest tyranny and usurpation; the
very last places in which I should have dreamt of
finding the least trace of the common law of this
kingdom; and yet, by a variety of subtle reasoning
and metaphysical refinements, have they
endeavoured to squeeze out the spirit of the common
law from premises in which it could not possibly
have existence.288
If anything, it seems that Camden and his fellows were willing
to accept or were capable of understanding the historical origin of
intellectual property in England. It demonstrates that the political
circumstance of this given era had narrowed their ability appreciate
or sanction the underlying legal principles of a previous
constitutional scheme. Simply put, the jurists of the late 18th century
conceived of their intellectual heritage as antithetical to their own
ideological beliefs. As a result, they simply rejected those legal
principles that shaped the sovereign theory and the legal scheme that
existed in England in the decades that led to the Civil War.
Nonetheless, the case clearly established that even if a common
law right in books or literary works existed historically, the Statute
of Anne has rendered this right irrelevant.289 The case therefore can
be seen as a clear triumph of Parliament’s supremacy over the
common law, but also as a moment of extreme dissonance between
legal practice and theory.
Provided with this historical survey, it is now possible to answer
the questions that were presented to the House of Lord’s in the case:
(1) Prior to the Civil War, authors did not possess a copyright in
their literary works; instead, printers were conferred with this right
by a sovereign act of distributive justice and were entitled to protect
these rights in the courts of common law. (2) Prior to the Civil War,
authors could sell their manuscripts to members of the Stationers’
Company in accordance with the laws of commutative commercial
exchanges but they had no legal authority to reprint, sell or to
288
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prohibit these actions after they have sold their work. (3) Parliament
as the supreme and ultimate seat of sovereignty, had the authority to
abolish the distributive regime that was instituted by Queen Mary
and replace it with another (i.e. the Statute of Anne). (4) Historically,
authors had no printing rights but members of the Stationers’
Company were vested by the prerogative with the sole right of
printing, publishing or distributing copies in perpetuity and they
were entitled to enforce this right in the courts of the common law.
(5) Finally, the historical rights that were conferred upon the
members of the company was indeed “impeached, restrained, or
taken away” by the subsequent Statute of Anne.290
CONCLUSION
Initially, this Note applied Locke’s labor theory to the AIA’s
first-inventor-to-file legal scheme. This attempted application has
revealed the inability of the theory to adequately explain the
animating principles of our prevailing patent jurisprudence. A short
historical survey demonstrated that in its origins, intellectual
property law had functioned in harmony alongside the
contemporaneous legal theory. For political reasons during the 17th
century, the system was first disturbed by practical political reforms
and later was itself theoretically reformed by John Locke. These
reformers denied the ability of the king to decide who can create and
own intellectual property. They also questioned the ability of any
sovereign government to select who should be granted property
rights. Locke’s new theory perceived property as a creation of
individual labor and deemed the process of private property
accumulation as reflective of personal merit. However romantic this
tale might sound, it simply did not represent the actual pre-existing
legal scheme that was historically constructed according to an
antithetical legal architecture. Perhaps surprisingly, the original
architecture of that legal system still governs our laws and to
generate any type of meaningful legal reforms in the field, we must
first come to terms with the inability of our prevailing ideology to
describe actual legal practice.
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